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REMOVING THE STATE OPT-OUT FOR
DEMAND RESPONSE
Ben Carroll*
In 1935, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act. The Act split jurisdiction over
electricity generation and distribution between the Federal and state governments. The Act
delegated to the Federal government jurisdiction over interstate wholesales and interstate
transmission. The Act gave state governments jurisdiction over intrastate wholesales,
intrastate transmission, generation, local distribution, and retail sales. Big, verticallyintegrated monopoly utilities dominated the market before and for 60 years after the passage
of the Act. However, over time, changes in technology and policy in the wholesale market
eroded the dominance of those vertically-integrated monopoly utilities and complicated this
jurisdictional bright line.
In 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 745,
requiring wholesale markets to permit demand response to operate on equal footing to
traditional sources of generation. Unlike typical electricity generation, demand response
involves paying consumers for a commitment not to consume electricity at a certain time. The
Supreme Court sustained that Order in the 2016 case FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Association. The Order allowed states to opt out of FERC’s demand response rules. This Note
advocates for the removal of that state opt-out, analyzes its likely success against court
challenges, and explores the possible limits of FERC jurisdiction after the 2020 case National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FERC. If demand response reaches its
full potential, it could provide as much electricity as hundreds of peak power plants. Removing
the opt-out and integrating all possible demand response resources into the wholesale market
is particularly timely and important given its potential to alleviate the economic and human
toll from widespread blackouts such as the February 2021 Texas power system failure.

* J.D., 2022, The George Washington School of Law. I thank the many professors and colleagues
who gave me input and advice as I wrote this piece, as well as my family for their enduring support.
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INTRODUCTION
It’s a hot summer day at 6 P.M. You have just sat down for dinner with the
lights and air conditioning on. Every home and business in the city have their lights
and air conditioning on, too. To accommodate this large increase in electricity
demand, electricity suppliers fire up peak power plants, which meet that demand
through inefficient, costly, and polluting means.1 Today, though, those peak plants
are sometimes not enough, as blackouts have increased by sixty percent over the last
five years.2 You pick up your fork and your power goes out. Rolling blackouts hit
your entire city. Your lights turn off just as you are ready to eat. Your air conditioning
stops working during the hottest time of the day. While these may be inconveniences
to some, they pose serious or fatal health risks to others.3 Although most blackouts
are associated with summer peaks, blackouts can also happen during winter. High
demand during cold snaps and the failure of non-winterized equipment increases
demand at a time of low supply, which leads to blackouts.4 The recent winter
blackouts in Texas tragically exemplify this very danger of cold snaps and nonwinterized equipment; indeed, the costs to homes and individuals ranged from the
major issue of lost power for weeks to the loss of hundreds of lives.5
One potential way to alleviate this peak stress—and to keep the lights on
and thermostat responsive—is to leverage demand response to serve peak electricity
load. Demand response is an opt-in program that allows end-use electricity
consumers to reduce their electricity usage during high-demand and peak-demand
times in exchange for reimbursements for their electricity reductions.6 This means
that, when the electricity grid approaches peak demand, on that hot summer day at
1.
At peak demand, increasing generation “uses excessive amounts of fuel, causes increased wear
and tear on generators, and creates additional levels of pollution compared to running generators at a
steady rate.” Brief of Grid Engineers and Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18–20,
Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260 (2016) (No. 14-840), 2015 WL
4397129, at *18–20.
2.
Christopher Flavelle, A New, Deadly Risk for Cities in Summer: Power Failures During Heat
Waves, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/03/climate/heat-climate-healthrisks.html.
3.
Spike in Deaths Blamed on 2003 New York Blackout, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2012),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackout-newyork/spike-in-deaths-blamed-on-2003-new-yorkblackout-idUSTRE80Q07G20120127.
4.
See Robert Walton, Annual Peak Loads Are Shifting to Winter; ACEEE Report Details How
Utilities Can Manage, UTILITYDIVE (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/annual-peakloads-are-shifting-to-winter-aceee-report-details-how-utilitie/598861/ (discussing how utilities have
begun to see peak loads in winter); Robert Walton, FERC Chair Glick Wants Mandatory Winterization
Standards for Power Plants Following Texas Grid Failure, UTILITYDIVE (Sept. 24, 2021),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-chair-glick-wants-mandatory-winterization-standards-for-powerplants/607111/ (discussing how failure to winterize exacerbated the Texas blackout).
5.
Christine Hauser & Edgar Sandoval, Death Toll from Texas Winter Storm Continues to Rise, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/us/texas-winter-storm-deaths.html.
6.
See, e.g., Market FAQs, PJM, https://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/buying-and-sellingenergy/markets-faqs/what-is-demand-response.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
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6 P.M., homeowners in a demand response program can simply reduce their
electricity consumption and receive payments for doing so. 7 Homeowners who do
not make it home until later can also participate by agreeing to have their electricity
demand reduced using smart thermostats.8 Industrial and commercial interests,
which provide the majority of demand response, benefit as well.9 With flexible
production cycles, industrial interests slow down their production and curtail their
electricity consumption at peak demand.10 Altogether, demand response can
effectively lower peak demand, lessen the need for peak power plants, lower end-user
costs, and possibly cut electricity demand as a whole.11
Demand response and other recent technologies reflect fundamental
changes in how electricity is provided. For instance, in the early decades of the
twentieth century, vertically-integrated monopoly utilities provided electricity;
today, those companies face competition, whether that competition be from an
independent electricity generator or a homeowner with solar panels.12 Most
electricity generation plants used to be huge; now, smaller plants abound and can be
more economical.13 Electricity could not be stored; now, utility-scale and consumerscale batteries exist and are becoming more efficient and common.14 Electricity
flowed one-way from the generator to the consumer; now, consumers may inject
electricity back into the grid.15 Electricity consumers’ relationship with electricity
providers was only that of a customer; now, they can actively participate in producing
their own electricity.16
In light of the introduction of demand response to this changing market,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) began to integrate demand
response into wholesale markets in 2008.17 FERC’s action integrating demand
response sparked a jurisdictional battle between FERC and the states.18 Under the
Federal Power Act and relevant precedent, a bright-line test determined who had
jurisdiction: the states could regulate retail markets and generation, and FERC could

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.
See Smart Elec. Power All., 2018 Utility Demand Response Market Snapshot 9,
https://sepapower.org/resource/2018-demand-response-market-snapshot/.
10.

Id.

11.

See infra Section II.A.

12.

Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 267-68 (2016).

13. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,544 (May 10, 1996).
14.

See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 267–68.

15. See Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Utility Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177,
1182 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
16.

Id. at 1182–83.

17.

See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 272.

18.

Id. at 272–77.
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regulate wholesale markets.19 Demand response presents a difficult application of
that test. It takes commitments from consumers in the retail markets and sells them
in the aggregate on the wholesale market.20 Who has jurisdiction over demand
response when it arguably falls on both sides of a bright-line test?
In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association
(“EPSA”), the Supreme Court answered that question.21 Under FERC’s jurisdiction
to regulate all rules or practices affecting wholesale market rates, FERC—and only
FERC—could regulate wholesale demand response.22 In addition, the EPSA decision
outlined a three-element test for determining whether an area falls within FERC’s
jurisdiction. Specifically, if a potential transaction falls on both sides of the brightline test, FERC may regulate it if its regulation “directly affects wholesale prices.”23
Regrettably, FERC’s action integrating demand response allowed states to
opt out; specifically, the states that opted out could block consumers within their
borders from selling demand response into wholesale markets.24 The Supreme Court
deemed that opt-out to be important in its analysis of whether FERC had exceeded
its jurisdiction, leaving open the question of whether the same action without a state
opt-out would be upheld.25 The D.C. Circuit likely answered that question several
years later in National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“NARUC”).26 In NARUC, the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s
action, which integrated electric storage resources but did not provide a state optout.27 Electric storage resources, which include the batteries of electric vehicles, can
both take energy from, and give energy to, the grid.28 Like demand response, electric
storage resources fundamentally change the nature of electricity provision and
challenge seemingly clear jurisdictional boundaries.29 This decision both extended
FERC’s jurisdiction over rules and practices affecting wholesale rates and provided
the possibility that FERC’s jurisdiction goes beyond what was upheld in EPSA.30
19.

Id. at 265–67.

20.

Id. at 270–71.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. at 289–90.

23.

Id. at 279 (emphasis added).

24. Demand Response Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16658
¶¶114–15 (Mar. 24, 2011) (“FERC Order 745”) (“By issuing this Final Rule, the Commission is not
requiring actions that would violate state laws or regulations...[T]his Final Rule is not intended to usurp
state authority or impede states from taking any actions within their authority.”).
25. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 287 (stating that “the finishing blow to [the argument FERC did not have
jurisdiction] comes from FERC’s notable solicitude toward the States” but not indicating whether the
solicitude and opt-out were necessary to sustain FERC’s jurisdiction).
26.

NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1177.

27.

Id. at 1190.

28.

Id. at 1182.

29.

See infra Section I.D.

30.

See infra Section I.D.
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Altogether, these decisions suggest that FERC very likely has the
jurisdiction to remove the state opt-out for demand response. FERC has recently
indicated that it may revisit the issue.31 This Note reviews FERC jurisdiction and
argues that FERC should remove the state opt-out for demand response to encourage
lower wholesale prices and higher reliability during times of high demand. In Part I,
this Note explains the history and regulation of electricity production, outlining
several fundamental changes in production and regulation that set demand response
up for a uniquely large impact. In Part II, this Note examines the benefits of FERC
removing the state opt-out for demand response and analyzes the likely success of a
FERC order removing the state opt-out for demand response.

I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION
UPENDED FROM 1935 TO TODAY
A. The Federal Power Act, the Regulated Utility, and the Traditional Model
Before 1935, states ruled the electricity regulatory roost and had “broad
authority to regulate public utilities” as part of their police power.32 However, the
Supreme Court limited that authority by proscribing state regulations that “directly
burden[] interstate commerce.”33 In Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., the Supreme Court invalidated a state electricity
commission’s regulation of interstate rates charged by a Rhode Island electricity plant
to a Massachusetts electricity reseller servicing Attleboro, Massachusetts. 34 The
Supreme Court ruled that states may not regulate sales of electricity in interstate
commerce because doing so violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.35 The state
utility commission regulation could not survive the Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge because it “place[d] a direct burden upon interstate commerce.”36 This
ruling created the “Attleboro gap” for electricity sales in interstate commerce: the
states could not regulate them, and Congress had not acted to regulate them, so no
authority regulated them.37

31. See Notice of Inquiry re Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers
in Markets, 174 FERC ¶ 61,198, ¶ 2 (Mar. 18, 2021) (“It has been over a decade since the Commission
established the Demand Response Opt-Out in Order Nos. 719 and 719-A. In that time, there have been
significant legal, policy, and technological developments that may warrant reconsideration of the Demand
Response Opt-Out.”).
32.

N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).

33.

Id.

34.

273 U.S. 84 (1927).

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

N.Y., 535 U.S. at 5–6.
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In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Power Act to fill the Attleboro gap.38
The Federal Power Act created the Federal Power Commission, FERC’s
predecessor,39 and vested it with powers including the regulation of interstate sales
of electricity.40 At that time, most companies that sold electricity operated as
vertically-integrated natural monopolies.41 Vertical integration meant that these
companies owned and operated the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electricity.42 Specifically, they generated the electricity in their own power plants,
transmitted the electricity across their own power lines, and distributed the
electricity to final customers on their own local distribution networks.43 Regulation
of vertically-integrated natural monopolies reflected a bargain made from a political
struggle.44 Regulators granted monopoly power to privately-owned utility companies
but obligated them to a duty of universal service of a given geographic area and
regulation of electricity rates by government actors.45 Regulation was especially
important because utilities could not store energy.46 This meant that without price
control, utilities could have discriminated between the most favorable customers (big
industrial interests) and the least favorable customers (isolated individual homes).47
This also meant that utilities could engage in price gouging of their customers.48
The regulatory model at the time of the Federal Power Act’s passage
assumed this framework and was divided between state and federal actors: states
regulated intrastate electricity sales, while federal actors regulated interstate
electricity sales.49 This division of jurisdiction worked well for decades, with few
jurisdictional conflicts being resolved by the courts.50 State utility commissions
38. Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 33, 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (repealed 2005); see also
Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266 (2016) (“Congress responded
to that invitation [to regulate interstate electricity sales] by passing the FPA in 1935.”).
39.

FERC replaced the FPC in 1977, assuming most of its functions. 42 U.S.C. §7172.

40. Id. For a fulsome discussion of how the Federal Power Act separated state and federal powers,
see infra Section I.D.
41. N.Y., 535 U.S. at 5. Some scholars believe that the presence of monopolistic firms does not
necessarily lead to monopolistic market pricing, putting more emphasis on the market effect of barriers to
entry and exit. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable
Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REGUL. 111 (1984).
42.

EPSA, 577 U.S. at 267.

43.

Id.

44. David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 417, 417–20 (2005).
45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

See id.

49.

Id.

50. After a 1972 Supreme Court decision, for example, no conflicts over state versus federal
jurisdiction arose for many years. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453
(1972).
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continued to regulate retail sales of electricity as well as local distribution networks.51
Pursuant to the Federal Power Act, the Federal Power Commission (now FERC)
set rates subject to its jurisdiction to ensure that the rates were “just and reasonable”
or otherwise not unduly discriminatory.52 Courts reviewing those rates would halt
their review if the rates were sufficient to maintain the financial integrity of the
utility, compensate the utility’s investors for the risks assumed, and enable the utility
to attract necessary new capital.53 This effectively gave utilities the right to earn a
profit, but not necessarily the right to earn the profit they believed they deserved.54

B. A New Challenger Arrives: Competition Upsets the Traditional Model
At the beginning of federal regulation in 1935, “[c]ompetition among
utilities was not prevalent.”55 Since then, the domination of vertically-integrated
regulated monopolies in electricity supply has decreased due to technological
advances and changes in policy resulting in greater generation competition and grid
interconnectivity.56 In light of this change, Congress and FERC updated their
respective regulatory models accordingly.57

1.

Innovation Disrupts Big Generators

Until the 1970s, large generation plants produced electricity at a
significantly lower cost than small generation plants.58 This created a competitive
advantage for large vertically-integrated utilities which could achieve economies of
scale.59 However, starting in the 1970s, this no longer was the rule because large
plants “need[ed] relatively greater maintenance and experience[d] longer

51.

Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 265–67 (2016).

52.

16 U.S.C. §§824(d)(a)–(b).

53.

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat'l. Gas. Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).

54. Id. at 602. In Hope Natural Gas, the utility and the FPC came up with different values for “just
and reasonable” rates the utility should be able to charge. Id. The Court noted that a utility challenging a
ratemaking order carries “the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is
unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.” Id. That is, a utility challenging a ratemaking order may not
challenge the rate as less than it wanted; a utility challenging a ratemaking order may only challenge the
rate as less than is necessary to ensure the current and future financial health of the utility. Id.
55.

New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).

56.

See id. at 5–8.

57.

See id. at 5–12.

58. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,544 (May 10, 1996).
59.

Id.
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downtimes.”60 In contrast, new technologies and several other efficiencies combined
to make small generation plants more efficient.61
These new technologies included combined cycle units and advancements
in conventional steam units.62 The combined cycle unit was “made possible by the
development of more efficient gas turbines, shorter construction lead times, lower
capital costs, increased reliability, and relatively minimal environmental impacts.”63
The steam unit advancement “provide[d] a more efficient and less polluting
resource.”64 Thus, with the introduction of these two technologies, small generators
producing less than 200 megawatts began producing electricity at a lower cost than
large generators producing about 500 megawatts, thereby eroding the competitive
advantage for large vertically-integrated utilities.65

2.

Congress and FERC Increase Competition

On top of technological advancements, legislative and regulatory
developments also hastened progress in the area. Specifically, in 1978, Congress,
through the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, further encouraged competition
in energy generation.66 The Act required large electric utilities to purchase electricity
from smaller generators if the smaller generator’s rates fell below the utility’s
incremental cost for generating or purchasing electricity.67 Under new provisions of
the Act, FERC also applied a lighter regulatory load to these smaller generators,
including the ability to sell electricity at market rates—as opposed to FERCdetermined rates—if they could demonstrate that they did not have market power
over their buyer.68
As the optimal generator size changed, so too did the nature of the
electricity grid.69 At first, the electricity grid which delivered electricity from

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65. A megawatt is equal to 1,000,000 watts. A typical coal generation plant produces 600
megawatts of electricity. How Is Electricity Measured?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 22,
2013); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,544 (May 10, 1996). The optimal size depended on
what fuel the generator used. Id. See also New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5–12
(2002).
66. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
67.

16 U.S.C. §824a-3.

68.

See, e.g., Dartmouth Powers Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 53 FERC ¶ 61,117 (1990).

69.

See New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002).
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generators to customers was most commonly a closed network.70 By the late 1960s,
however, utilities had interconnected these networks so much that large regional
grids had formed, covering nearly the whole of the continental United States.71
Utilities could and often did use their power to deny market access to other
generators, including smaller generators integrated by the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act.72 By refusing to allow use of their transmission lines, utilities effectively
blocked smaller generators’ access to those markets.73 In industry parlance, allowing
use of transmission to reach other markets is known as “wheeling.”74
Authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 1992,75 FERC Order 888 acted to
remedy this discrimination by ordering “functional unbundling” of wholesale
generation and transmission services.76 This Order required each utility to state
separate rates for its wholesale generation services and its transmission services.77 It
further required “wheeling” for three categories of electricity sales: (1) wholesale
sales, (2) unbundled retail sales in interstate commerce, and (3) retail sales in which
the utility voluntarily offered (or the state required) unbundled retail access.78
Order 888 ultimately led to an open access market, with more widespread
permission to base sales on market-based rates.79 It also included encouragement to
form regional transmission entities that it labelled Independent System Operators,
and FERC followed that up with Order 2000, which encouraged the formation of
Regional Transmission Organizations.80 In particular, Order 2000 required
transmission-owning utilities to “make certain filings with respect to forming and
participating in a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO).”81
70.

Id.

71. Id. In 1967, one regional electric grid covered at least Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and some central and midwestern states. Interconnections between utilities in these states
formed these grids. Florida Power & Light Co., 37 F.P.C. 544, 548 (1967).
72.

New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 9 (2002).

73.

Id. at 8-9.

74.

Id. at 9.

75. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified at, among
other places, 15 U.S.C. 79z–5a and 16 U.S.C. 796 (22–25), 824j–l); Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540,
21,546 (May 10, 1996).
76. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,551 (May 10, 1996). The Supreme Court upheld
FERC’s jurisdiction to issue this Order in 2002. New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 2
(2002).
77.

New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 2 (2002).

78.

Id. at 11.

79. David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 417, 425 (2005).
80. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No.2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,285 (1999)
(“FERC Order 2000”) (codified at18 C.F.R. § 35.34).
81.

Id. at § 35.34(a).
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It is these wholesale market managers, the Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, that largely operationalize
FERC’s management of the grid today.82 They own and manage regional
transmission networks.83 They also hold several different types of auctions for
electricity, including same-day auctions, next-day auctions, and several-year auctions,
which are subject to FERC jurisdiction and follow market-based pricing.84 Regional
transmission organizations in particular must be independent from utilities, regional
in scope and configuration, reliable, and have operational authority.85 Regional
transmission organizations must also administer and design transmission rates,
manage congestion, monitor markets, and plan for the future, among other
requirements.86
Currently, seven wholesale market managers are in operation and
correspond to different regions in the United States.87 Despite the presence of
wholesale market managers in much of the country, broad swaths of the United States
have no wholesale market manager.88 Without a wholesale market manager, these
regions are still connected to the grid, but lack an independent entity that efficiently
manages wholesale transactions including demand response transactions.89

C. Emerging Participation Models and Energy Technologies Challenge the
Traditional Model
Recently, new models of participation and technologies in the electricity
wholesale market have challenged assumptions underlying the traditional model of
82. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 578 U.S. 150, 154–58 (2016). This Note will refer to
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators collectively as wholesale market
managers because they both perform very similar functions in managing the wholesale markets.
83.

Id. at 154-55.

84. Id. at 154-58. The several-year auctions are known as capacity auctions and formed the basis
of the dispute in Hughes.
85. See Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No.2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,285
(1999) (codified at18 C.F.R. § 35.34).
86.

Id.

87. RTOs and ISOs, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/electric/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos (last updated Feb. 17, 2022). These wholesale market
managers are CAISO (California), ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas, covering most of
Texas), SPP (Southwest Power Pool, covering most of Oklahoma north through the Dakotas), MISO
(Midcontinent ISO, covering most of Louisiana north through Michigan and Minnesota), PJM
(Pennsylvania, Jersey, and Maryland, which actually covers a large block of states from Illinois to New
Jersey), NYISO (New York), and ISO-NE (New England).
88. Electric Power Markets, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/market-assessments/electric-power-markets (last updated July 20, 2021). Regions without a wholesale
market manager include the southwest (Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona), northwest (from Utah to
Washington), and southeast (from Alabama to the Carolinas and Florida)
89. See RTOs and ISOs, supra note 87; see also supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text (describing
wholesale market managers and their functions in promoting an efficient wholesale market).
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energy production and regulation. This has resulted in shifts in the regulatory
regime. Specifically, demand response challenges the traditional model’s assumption
that only generators respond to increases in demand.90 Customers may now choose
to use less electricity during peak time when electricity demand is highest—say, 5
P.M. in the summer—and markets pay that customer as they would a supplier.91
Thus, demand response works by calling on commitments not to consume electricity
and treating them as supply, rather than actually meeting the demand with increased
electricity generation from expensive and polluting peak generation plants.92 By
treating a user’s decision not to demand electricity as supply of electricity, the
wholesale market incentivizes the reduction of demand: a consumer committing not
to use electricity during peak demand not only does not pay peak price but also gets
paid not to use electricity.93 This has the benefit of “curb[ing] wholesale rates and
prevent[ing] grid breakdowns.”94 Now, not only can generators respond to increases
in demand using additional electricity generation, but customers can also respond to
increases in demand using demand response.95
Similarly, electric storage resources, which can “both inject energy into the
grid and receive energy from it,” challenge the traditional assumption that energy
must be generated in real time to match demand.96 Electric storage resources allow
those who would typically be customers to sell stored energy—say, from their electric
car batteries—back to the grid, which also curbs wholesale rates.97 The innovation of
demand response and electric storage resources have already been integrated into the
regulatory regime.98
Recently, FERC issued Order 2222, which requires wholesale market
managers to update their regulatory model to integrate distributed energy resource

90.

See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 265.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 270.

93.

Id. at 265–72.

94.

Id. at 270.

95.

Id. at 270-71.

96. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177, 1182
(D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Order No. 841, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, para. 2, 7 (May 23, 2019)). As the NARUC
decision notes, electric storage resources “obliterate a foundational notion underpinning our electrical
systems—that electricity cannot be efficiently stored for later use.” NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1182. Four years
before that decision, the Supreme Court explained in EPSA that real-time demand auctions are “needed
because, unlike most products, electricity cannot be stored effectively.” EPSA, 577 U.S. at 268. Although
accurate at the time and a longstanding assumption of the regulatory model, that assumption no longer
stands.
97.

NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1183-86.

98. See EPSA, 577 U.S. 260 (demand response); NARUC, 964 F.3d 1177 (electric storage
resources).
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aggregators.99 Distributed energy resources are “any resource located [either] on the
distribution system,” on a distribution subsystem, “or behind a customer meter.”100
Some examples of distributed energy resources are “electric storage resources,
distributed generation, demand response, energy efficiency, thermal storage, and
electric vehicles and their supply equipment.”101 These distributed energy
aggregators contract with many of the distributed energy resources so that, in the
aggregate, they may be able to participate in wholesale markets.102
Finding “that existing [wholesale market manager] market rules… present
barriers to the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations in the
[federally managed] markets, and such barriers reduce competition and fail to ensure
just and reasonable rates,” FERC ordered reforms to remove the qualification and
performance requirements that caused those barriers.103 Unlike in its initial Order on
demand response, FERC considered but ultimately decided against providing a state
opt-out for distributed energy resources; however, FERC also did not remove the
state opt-out for demand response.104 FERC attributed this refusal to its claim that
it does not purport to regulate state-jurisdictional facilities.105
FERC’s changing attitude towards demand response, electric storage
resources, and now distributed energy resource aggregators suggest these innovations
may fall on both sides of fairly well-defined jurisdictional lines.106 As a result, these
innovations present jurisdictional issues for regulators attempting to integrate them
into the existing regime.107 This problem, in addition to the problem presented by

99. Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 85 Fed. Reg. 67,094, 67,095 (proposed
Oct. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.35).
100. Id. at 67,114.
101. Id. at n.1.
102. Id. at ¶ 5.
103. Id. at ¶ 26.
104. The Order provides an opt-out for small utilities, defined as “those with a total electric output
for the preceding fiscal year not exceeding 4 million MWh.” Id. at p. 45 n. 136.
105. FERC wrote that “this final rule ‘addresses—and addresses only—transactions occurring on
the wholesale market.’” Id. at ¶ 58 (quoting Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260, 282 (2016)).
106. See infra Section I.D.
107. The jurisdictional issues arise from tough applications of the jurisdictional test. They do not
arise from an unclear test. However, some view EPSA and other Supreme Court decisions as muddling
the Federal Power Act’s bright line. See Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and
State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203 (2015). I disagree. EPSA did not destroy the
previous bright line jurisdictional test. Demand response, battery resources, and other innovations simply
present difficult applications of the jurisdictional test because they can affect resources delegated to the
states and resources delegated to the Federal government at the same time. See also Matthew R.
Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live The Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1360,
1361–71 (2021).
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several other developing technologies and participation models, are explored in detail
in the following section, Section I.D, as well as in Section II.B.

D. Refereeing Offsides in Federal and State Electricity Jurisdiction
The Federal Power Act gives FERC jurisdiction over electricity
transmission in interstate commerce and to wholesale sales in interstate commerce,
as well as the attendant facilities.108 FERC must ensure the rates charged in wholesale
sales, and all rules and regulations affecting such rates, are “just and reasonable.”109
The Federal Power Act leaves intact the states’ jurisdiction over electricity
generation, local distribution, intrastate transmission, electricity consumed wholly by
the transmitter, and the attendant facilities.110 The Act set out clear jurisdictional
lines that worked well for the early model of electricity supply by a verticallyintegrated monopoly utility, but courts later had to make decisions that dealt with
subsequent technological, competitive, and regulatory advances that did not fall as
clearly on one side of those lines.111 This resulted in courts having to “referee...offsides” in disputes between federal and state governments regarding which had
jurisdiction over a given issue or transaction.112
In 1964, the Supreme Court drew a jurisdictional line that made FERC
jurisdiction “plenary and extending to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce”
regardless of how much of the electricity in the sale came from interstate
transactions.113 Notably, the Supreme Court later clarified that FERC has
jurisdiction over virtually all wholesale sales, given the interconnected nature of the
grid and the possibility that any given wholesale could contain electricity produced
in another state.114 States, conversely, retained their authority to regulate electricity
generation facilities, local distribution facilities, intrastate transmission facilities, and
transmission facilities for electricity consumed wholly by the transmitter.115 As a
result, state regulations that aim at FERC’s jurisdiction over facilities or transactions
may be challenged as preempted by the Federal Power Act.116 For example, a state
could not subsidize wholesale market prices by guaranteeing a minimum price for a
108. 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1). The Federal Power Act defines wholesale as “a sale of electric energy
to any person for resale.” Id. §824(d).
109. Id. §824d(a).
110. Id. §824d(a). See also Adam Vann, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11411, The Legal Framework of the Federal
Power Act (2020).
111. Supra Part I; see also Nordhaus, supra note 1077; Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA:
Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 101 (2016).
112. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177, 1181
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
113. Fed. Power Comm’n v S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 216 (1964).
114. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972).
115. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 216; 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1).
116. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 164 (2016).
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wholesale transaction.117 The Federal Power Act preempts such a guarantee by the
state because it aims at prices of wholesale sales.118
In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified the extent of FERC jurisdiction in
EPSA, where the Court considered FERC’s Order 745, which required wholesale
market managers to permit the participation of demand response in wholesale
markets.119 Importantly, FERC Order 745 gave states an opt-out through which they
could prohibit demand response within their boundaries.120 Thus, states using this
opt-out can effectively prevent consumers from selling their demand response onto
wholesale markets.121 In upholding FERC’s regulation of demand response as within
its jurisdiction, the Court judged FERC to be “onside” of the traditional
jurisdictional bright line even though it affected what would normally be on the
states’ side of that line—retail consumers and their transactions.122
In EPSA, FERC asserted jurisdiction over demand response through a
Federal Power Act provision granting it jurisdiction over “any rule, regulation,
practice, or contract affecting such [wholesale] rate[s].”123 The Court upheld FERC’s
action but limited this jurisdiction with a three-step test.124 First, FERC’s action
must “directly affect wholesale rates.”125 Second, FERC’s action must not regulate a
sphere left to the states by the Federal Power Act.126 Third, the first and second
determinations must not conflict with the Federal Power Act’s core purposes to “curb
prices and enhance reliability in the wholesale electricity market.”127

117. Id. at 165–66.
118. Id.
119. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260 (2016).
120. Demand Response Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16658
¶¶114–15 (Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §35.28(g)(1)(v)).
121. Id.
122. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 266; 16 U.S.C. §824(b)(1).
123. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 266 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)).
124. Id. at 276–77.
125. Id. at 277–79. Demand response directly affects wholesale rates by accepting bids not to
purchase power only if that bid “displac[ed] higher-priced generation,” lowering the auction price and
putting downward pressure on generation bids. Id. This element of the test also limits FERC’s jurisdiction
further than the Federal Power Act does, which gives it jurisdiction to change all rules and regulations
affecting wholesale rates. The Court limited that statutory language to give FERC jurisdiction only to
change all rules and regulations directly affecting jurisdiction; in doing so, the Court noted that “a nonhyperliteral reading is needed to prevent the statute from assuming near-infinite breadth.” Id.
126. Id. at 279–88. Demand response did not regulate retail sales; demand response regulated
wholesale sales by integrating another supplier into the market. The effect on retail sales of FERC’s Order
is “of no legal consequence” so long as FERC does not regulate retail sales. Id.
127. Id. at 288–91. Here, the Court opined that the position that FERC could not regulate demand
response would “subvert the [Federal Power Act]” by placing a practice that could enhance reliability and
curb prices outside the jurisdiction of any regulatory body. Id. That would further mean that, under the
Federal Power Act’s requirement that some entity have jurisdiction over transactions for electricity, no
transaction for demand response could proceed. Id.
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In a later case, the D.C. Circuit upheld another FERC assertion of
jurisdiction over electric storage resources.128 An electric storage resource can “both
inject energy into the grid and receive energy from it,” and an electric car battery is
a familiar example of an electric storage resource.129The vast majority of electric
storage resources on the grid are utility-scale pumped hydroelectric storage,130 but
that may change after FERC’s Order 841. The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC Order
841 in NARUC, which required wholesale market managers to integrate electric
storage resources into wholesale markets and barred states from prohibiting electric
storage resources participating in federal wholesale markets.131 First, proceeding
under EPSA’s three-element test, the Court found that electric storage resources
could lower wholesale prices.132 Second, the Order regulated who had access to
federal wholesale markets and did not regulate local distribution facilities.133 Third
and finally, the Court determined that the prior elements did not conflict with the
Federal Power Act’s core purposes of lowering price and enhancing reliability.134 In
upholding Order 841 as within FERC’s jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit judged FERC
to be “onside” of the traditional jurisdictional bright line again even though the Order
affected local distribution facilities.135 For example, a Tesla owner who sold leftover
electricity from their car battery onto the wholesale market would affect local
distribution facilities because those local distribution facilities would be required to
transport the electricity to the interstate market. Thus, in regulating storage
resources, FERC necessarily affected local distribution facilities without regulating
those facilities.136
Although EPSA and NARUC did not fundamentally change state or federal
jurisdiction over electricity, these precedents did clarify that FERC may be able to
regulate facilities or transactions traditionally within the states’ jurisdiction so long
as its rules directly affect or aim at wholesale markets.137 States, however, still retain
128. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177 (D.C.
Cir. 2020).
129. Id. at 1182.
130. Pumped hydroelectric storage uses electricity to pump water to an elevated reservoir; when
electricity is needed, the reservoir can be released to flow through a turbine and generate electricity.
Electricity Storage, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (last visited Jan. 21, 2022),
https://www.epa.gov/energy/electricity-storage.
131. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1182.
132. Id. at 1186.
133. Id. at 1186–89.
134. Id. at 1185–89.
135. Id. For an excellent and more lengthy discussion of FERC’s jurisdiction, see Matthew R.
Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1360
(2021).
136. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1186–89.
137. See Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 279–88 (2016);
see also NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1188. The D.C. Circuit has also said that the Order at issue neither “usurp[s]
state power” nor “re-draws the jurisdictional divide between FERC and the States.” NARUC, 964 F.3d
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their jurisdiction over electricity generation facilities, local distribution facilities,
intrastate transmission facilities, and transmission facilities for electricity consumed
wholly by the transmitter.138 For electric storage resources specifically, states also
retain some ability to force them to choose to participate in interstate or intrastate
markets, to impose safety and reliability requirements on them, and to require
permitting for them.139 States also retain their ability to insulate retail prices from
wholesale prices140 and promote certain forms of generation with subsidies linked to
wholesale market price.141 As an additional note, EPSA and NARUC upheld FERC
Orders in response to facial challenges, which suggests that those Orders may still be
challenged on as-applied grounds.142

at 1188 (quoting EPSA, 577 U.S. at 283). For a contrary view that the Federal Power Act limits federal
jurisdiction to only wholesale sales and leaves all other jurisdiction to the states, see Scalia’s dissent in
EPSA, 577 U.S. at 297–98 (“The pertinent question under the Act is whether the rule regulates sales ‘at
wholesale.’ If so, it falls within FERC’s regulatory authority. If not, the rule is unauthorized whether or
not it happens to regulate ‘retail electricity sales’; for, with exceptions not material here, the [Federal
Power Act] prohibits FERC from regulating ‘any other sale of electric energy’ that is not at wholesale....
While the majority would find every sale of electric energy to be within FERC’s authority to regulate
unless the transaction is demonstrably a retail sale, the statute actually excludes from FERC’s jurisdiction
all sales of electric energy except those that are demonstrably sales at wholesale.”). However, this view of
the Federal Power Act is unlikely to become the accepted view for two reasons: first, three Justices from
the EPSA majority—Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kagan—will remain on the Supreme Court; and second,
the Supreme Court adheres strongly to stare decisis in matters of statutory interpretation. See Hillel Y.
Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1050-51 (2013) (“Traditionally, courts have
given even greater deference to precedents concerning questions of statutory interpretation and
application than they have to constitutional and common law precedents. The justification for this ‘superstrong’ statutory precedent rule is that legislative silence suggests acquiescence to a court’s interpretation
of a statute, or even that the legislature agrees that the court’s interpretation of the statute was correct.”).
138. 16 U.S.C. §824d(a)-(d); see also EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279-80 (federal jurisdiction over retail sales
to the extent that the regulation aims at wholesale markets); see also NARUC, 964 F.3d 1177 at 1188 (federal
jurisdiction over local distribution networks to the extent that the regulation aims at who may participate
in wholesale markets).
139. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1188.
140. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 283.
141. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 56 (2d Cir. 2018) (In doing so, states
must be careful to link the subsidy to wholesale market price without linking it to wholesale market
transactions) (emphasis added). Compare id. (upholding state subsidy for nuclear energy linked to
calculation based on wholesale market price), with Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S.Ct. 1288
(2016) (invalidating state subsidy for wholesale electricity capacity linked to transactions occurring on
wholesale markets).
142. See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 295; NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1188–89 (“A facial challenge prevails where
‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [Orders] would be valid.’” (quoting Ass’n of Priv. Sector
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2012))).

380

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:2

II. WHY AND HOW FERC SHOULD RETHINK THE STATE OPT-OUT
FOR DEMAND RESPONSE IN THE FEDERAL WHOLESALE MARKET
FERC has the power to remove the state opt-out under EPSA’s and
NARUC’s recognition that FERC has broad power to incidentally affect retail or
distribution practices that directly affect wholesale prices.143 EPSA and NARUC
allow FERC to issue rules and regulations that have the purpose of regulating the
wholesale market, and who may participate in it, but also regulate areas of the
electricity delivery system that are conventionally subject to state jurisdiction.144
FERC has recently raised the possibility that it may remove the state optout for demand response.145 This Note argues that it should. Specifically, FERC
should remove the state opt-out because the existing opt-out hinders demand
response’s potential to increase reliability, reduce market prices, prevent damaging
blackouts, and fight climate change. In addition, FERC likely has the legal authority
to do so under EPSA and almost certainly under NARUC.

A. Why FERC Should Remove the State Opt-Out for Demand Response
Several legal and practical realities support FERC removing the state optout for demand response. First, only FERC has the authority to remove the state
opt-out and is hence the only actor that can ensure the wholesale market enjoys full
participation of demand response. Second, by removing the state opt-out, FERC
would be responding to the demand of wholesale market operators to fully integrate
demand response. Third, integrating demand response fully will ensure that demand
response can combine with other exciting technologies and models of participation
that remove historical limits on the provision of electricity. Fourth, demand response
has not achieved its full potential, and removing the opt-out would push it in this
direction. Fifth, FERC should act quickly to remove the opt-out because any legal
challenges would create a regulatory lag. Each of these points is addressed in turn
below.
First, the Supreme Court has indicated that only FERC may assert
jurisdiction over participants in the wholesale market, and accordingly only FERC
may act to ensure all states have wholesale demand response.146 If FERC will not
regulate, then in states that opt out of demand response there can be no demand

143. See supra Section I.D.
144. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 264-65; NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1181-82.
145. See Notice of Inquiry re Participation of Aggregators of Retail Demand Response Customers
in Markets, 174 FERC ¶ 61,198 (Mar. 18, 2021).
146. See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 288–89 (discussing how states may not regulate demand response but
FERC may).

Winter 2022

Removing the State Opt-Out for Demand Response

381

response in wholesale markets at all.147 Some states, mostly in the Midwest, have
used this veto.148 Thus, the state opt-out effectively leaves a decision about whether
federal regulations will apply within a state’s boundaries in the states’ hands.149 The
result is that the regulation is no longer mandatory but rather optional, thus
undercutting FERC’s power over wholesale markets. By removing the state opt-out,
FERC would not infringe upon any jurisdictional boundaries and would maintain
control over its regulatory prerogative.
Second, the original purpose behind FERC’s integration of demand
response was to realize the benefits from managing supply and demand in wholesale
markets.150 These benefits include increasing reliability and alleviating the stress on
the grid and electricity providers during times of peak demand.151 During peak
demand, wholesale markets often see service interruptions or grid breakdowns, price
increases disproportionate to demand increases, and activation of peak generators
which tend to be the most expensive and polluting.152 Demand response effectively
lowers peak demand by providing payments for not consuming electricity during
peaks, thereby helping to reduce some of the worst problems with peak demand.153
Furthermore, although states may insulate retail prices from wholesale prices, the
prices of retail and wholesale markets tend to be linked, and a decrease in wholesale
prices should lead to a decrease in retail prices.154 In sum, integrating “[d]emand

147. See id. (“If neither FERC nor the States can regulate wholesale demand response, then by
definition no one can. But under the Act, no electricity transaction can proceed unless it is regulable by
someone.”)
148. JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 985 (5th ed. 2020).
149. See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 287–88.
150. For an early example of a wholesale market operator seeking and obtaining approval for
demand response, see PJM Interconnection, Order Accepting Tariff Sheets as Modified, 95 FERC
¶61,306 (2001).
151. See EPSA, 577 U.S. 270–72; see also MICHAEL MILLIGAN & BRENDAN KIRBY, UTILIZING
LOAD RESPONSE FOR WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION AND POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 1–2 (2010)
(describing benefits of demand response).
152. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 269-70. Demand response can often be a more efficient peak management
strategy than additional generation. See, e.g., MILLIGAN & KIRBY, supra note 151. At peak use, increasing
generation “uses excessive amounts of fuel, causes increased wear and tear on generators, and creates
additional levels of pollution compared to running generators at a steady rate.” Brief of Grid Engineers
and Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18–20, EPSA, 577 U.S. 260 (No. 14-840),
2015 WL 4397129, at *18–20.
153. See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 270–72.
154. See PETER CAPPERS & SEAN MURPHY, UNPACKING THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN
WHOLESALEANDRETAILELECTRICRATES(Aug.2019),https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/f
iles/wholesale-retail_price_trends_results_20190822_finalv4.pdf. In particular, this report found that, in
several RTO markets, wholesale and retail electric rates fell between 2008 and 2016. Wholesale rates fell
faster than retail rates (6.2% per year decrease in wholesale rates as compared to 0.8% decrease in retail
rates). Additionally, not all regions experienced a decrease in retail rates. The authors offered several
reasons for the disconnect, including increases in capital expenditures and increases in operation and
maintenance costs. Id.
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response, then, emerged not as a [FERC] power grab, but instead as a marketgenerated innovation for more optimally balancing wholesale electricity supply and
demand.”155
Beyond the approval of market operators, Congress also enshrined its
approval of demand response in law.156 It is not difficult to understand why:
electricity at peak demand is very expensive, and the cost of blackouts—a possibility
when supply cannot meet peak demand—is even higher.157 Take, for example, the
February 2021 Texas blackout. Tragically, Texas officials state that 246 people died
during the blackout.158 Economic losses were also staggering: demand rose so quickly
that wholesale prices went from a normal of $50 to over $9,000 per megawatt-hour
(a unit of electricity).159 Beyond losses on transactions at abnormally high rates, other
losses when the power goes out include water damage from pipes bursting, lost
output from factories, and lost output from businesses.160 Although it will take some
time for accurate accounting, sources estimate that the economic cost of the February
2021 Texas blackouts could range from 125 to over 200 billion dollars.161 Although
demand response alone could not have prevented this disaster, it could be an integral
part of a market strategy that could have beneficial spillover effects. In particular, if
FERC removed the state opt-out, it would heighten wholesale reliability and lower
wholesale prices with positive knock-on effects for the retail market.
Third, integrating demand response and electric storage resources altered
fundamental and limiting assumptions about electricity delivery, and in light of
forthcoming integration of distributed energy resources, FERC should remove the
state opt-out to demand response to allow the combination of demand response with
155. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 286.
156. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §1252, 119 Stat. 594, 965.
157. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REGIONAL WHOLESALE MARKETS: DECEMBER 2020
(2021), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/wholesale-markets.php (data that shows huge
variation in peak demand rates, with some reaching $1300 per MWh while most wholesale rates stay under
$100 per MWh); see also Justine Calma, Texas’ Blackouts May Come at a Steep Cost, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/19/22291426/texas-blackouts-utility-bills-electricity-cost-energyinsecurity (noting that wholesale electricity prices rose from a normal of $50 to over $9,000 per MWh
during the recent Texas blackouts); Loren Steffy, Despite Losing Power for Days, Texans Will Pay Higher
Power Bills—Perhaps for Decades to Come, TEXAS MONTHLY (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/blackout-crisis-texans-electric-bills/ (discussing the high
economic cost of the February 2021 blackouts in Texas).
158. Patrick Svitek, Texas Puts Final Estimate of Winter Storm Death Toll at 246, TEX. TRIBUNE (Jan.
3, 2022), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/01/02/texas-winter-storm-final-death-toll-246/.
159. Justine Calma, Texas’ Blackouts May Come at a Steep Cost, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/19/22291426/texas-blackouts-utility-bills-electricity-cost-energyinsecurity (noting that wholesale electricity prices rose from a normal of $50 to over $9,000 per MWh
during the recent Texas blackouts).
160. Steffy, supra note 157.
161. Steffy, supra note 157 (estimating that costs could exceed $125B); see also Irina Ivanova, Texas
Winter Storm Costs Could Top $200 Billion—More Than Hurricanes Harvey and Ike, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25,
2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-winter-storm-uri-costs/.
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other exciting technologies and participation models that enable efficiencies on the
grid. For instance, the first wholesale transactions for demand response occurred in
the early 2000s,162 but by 2018, demand response resources totaled over 60
gigawatts,163 and wholesale demand response resources were equivalent to 6.6% of
peak demand.164 Because peak demand uses more expensive and less clean electricity
generators, this increase in demand response participation translated to a relatively
larger decrease in wholesale price.165
FERC should, therefore, remove the state opt-out for demand response to
bring it to all corners of the wholesale market. Demand response, electric storage
resources, and distributed energy resources together have the potential to form key
elements of a new market strategy that could reduce costs at the best of times and
prevent blackouts at the worst of times; FERC should remove the state opt-out to
allow the integration of these technologies everywhere.
Fourth, demand response has not achieved its estimated potential because
the state opt-out has restricted its penetration into federal wholesale markets. FERC
estimated in 2009 that demand response has the potential to reduce peak demand by
38 to 188 gigawatts by 2019.166 A typical peak power plant is 75 megawatts (or 0.075
gigawatts).167 Put another way, demand response has the potential to reduce the need
for roughly 500 to 2,500 peak plants.168 In that 2009 report, FERC estimated that
expanding demand response to all states would reduce peak demand by 82 gigawatts
by 2019.169 Since then, FERC has produced annual reports on demand response
which detail wholesale demand response resources and retail demand response
resources.170 For 2018, the most recent year with comprehensive data available,

162. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Order Accepting Tariff Sheets as Modified, 95 FERC
¶61,306 (2001).
163. A gigawatt is equal to 1,000 megawatts. A megawatt is equal to 1,000,000 watts. A typical coal
generation plant produces 600 megawatts of electricity, which is equal to 0.6 gigawatts of electricity. How
Is Electricity Measured?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 22, 2013),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/how-electricity-measured..
164. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, 2020 ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND
ADVANCED
METERING
16–21
(2020),
https://cms.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/202012/2020%20Assessment%20of%20Demand%20Response%20and%20Advanced%20Metering_December%
202020.pdf.
165. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, HARNESSING THE POWER OF DEMAND
40–42,
https://www.naesb.org//pdf3/irc_dr_report_101607.pdf (model finding that reducing peak load by 3%
could reduce wholesale prices by 6–12%.)
166. Id.
167. See FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE
POTENTIAL x (2009).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., supra note 164, at 16-21 (report on integration of demand response and advanced
metering in wholesale and retail markets).
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demand response resources contributed 63.3 gigawatts.171 Even if wholesale demand
response resources grew in 2020 at five times the rate they did in 2019, demand
response resources still would not meet FERC’s projection of 82 gigawatts of demand
resources if demand response were extended to all states.172
For example, if the Southwest Power Pool, which contributed almost no
wholesale demand response resources in the past year,173 realized its full potential, it
could contribute up to 5 gigawatts of demand response resources.174 The northwest,
southwest, and southeast electricity markets, which do not have wholesale market
managers and thus do not report wholesale demand response, also have huge
potential to add wholesale demand response resources. Together, they could
contribute roughly 5.2 to 26 gigawatts if wholesale demand response penetrated those
markets to the same extent that it did in other markets.175
Regardless of whether the additional demand response resources come from
those specific markets or from advances in all wholesale markets, removing the state
opt-out could reduce the need for hundreds of dirty and expensive peak power
plants.176 In light of its benefits to the wholesale market and the current failure for
demand response resources to live up to their potential, FERC should remove the
state opt-out so as to realize the full potential of demand response.

171. See id. In 2018, retail demand response resources contributed 30.9 gigawatts (a 1.9% decrease
from the previous year) and wholesale demand response resources contributed 32.4 gigawatts (a 9.2%
increase from the previous year). Id.; see also FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, 2019 ASSESSMENT OF
DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING (2019).
172. Five times the 2019 growth rate of 9.2% would be 46%. Growth of 46% on 2019’s 32.4
gigawatts of wholesale demand resources would mean 47.3 gigawatts of demand resources. After adding
in the 30.9 gigawatts of retail demand resources, this would still only be 78.2 gigawatts, less than FERC’s
original estimate that expansion to all states would create 82 gigawatts of total demand response resources.
This assumes that retail demand response does not change much, which has been true over the past few
years according to FERC’s reports. See supra note 164.
173. See id.
174. See Robert Walton, Southwest Power Pool Registers Voltus as First Demand Response Services
Provider, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/southwest-power-pool-registersvoltus-as-first-demand-response-services-pro/568853/.
175. The northwest market peaks at 63 gigawatts, and the southwest market peaks at 42 gigawatts.
Electric Power Markets, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/market-assessments/electric-power-markets. The southeast market peaks around 155 gigawatts. John
D. Wilson & Maggie Shober, Electric Demand in the Southeastern United States 8, S. ALL. FOR CLEAN
ENERGY (Apr. 2, 2020), https://cleanenergy.org/news-and-resources/seasonal-electric-demand-in-thesoutheastern-united-states/. Thus, together, they have about 260 gigawatts of peak demand. Demand
response makes up about 2% of peak demand on the low end and about 10% of peak demand on the high
end for federal markets which have seriously integrated them. Supra note 164, at 20. Therefore, they could
contribute from 5.2 gigawatts (2% of the 260 gigawatts total) to 26 gigawatts (10% of the 260 gigawatts
total) of demand response.
176. See supra note 175 (if Southwest Power Pool, northwest power market, southwest power
market, and southeast power market realized demand response potential, it could equal 10.2 gigawatts to
31 gigawatts); see also supra note 167 (peak power plant contributes 0.075 gigawatts).
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Fifth, FERC actions face a lot of uncertainty in how long they will take to
be integrated into the federal wholesale market. FERC should act now to assure quick
integration of demand response in all states. Take demand response and electric
storage resources as contrasting examples. Congress signaled its intent for demand
response to be an energy priority in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.177 FERC first
asserted jurisdiction via Order 719 in 2008, requiring regional markets to integrate
demand response aggregators.178 FERC then gave its regulations teeth via Order 745
in 2011 by requiring that demand response pay wholesale market price to aggregators
of retail customers with demand response agreements.179 Wholesale power suppliers
sued, and the final judgment came down in 2016.180 Eleven years passed between
Congress recognizing demand response as a national energy priority and the
Supreme Court upholding FERC’s final Order integrating it into the market, and
eight years passed between FERC’s assertion of jurisdiction and having that assertion
upheld. In contrast, FERC first asserted authority over electric storage resources in
2018 and had that authority upheld in 2020.181 How long the regulatory lag lasts may
depend on the type of agency action, the care taken by the agency in the regulatory
process, the slow process of judicial review, and how controversial the regulation is,
among other things.182 Given the uncertainty surrounding the regulatory lag, FERC
should move quickly to remove the state opt-out as it may take years to realize the
benefits of an action to remove it.

B. How FERC May Remove the State Opt-Out Using EPSA and NARUC
EPSA and NARUC opened a wide avenue for FERC to remove the state
opt-out for demand response in the federal wholesale market. Like how it integrated
demand response with a state opt-out, FERC may first conduct a study and find that
177. Supra note 156.
178. See Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64119
(Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §35(g)(1)).
179. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg.
16658 (Mar. 15, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §35) (defining and integrating demand response aggregators
into the wholesale market).
180. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260 (2016).
181. After its initial order, FERC reheard and clarified the order in 2018. Electric Storage
Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System
Operators, 167 FERC ¶ 61,154 (May 16, 2019) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §35(g)(9)(i)). Opponents sued and
challenged both the Order and Rehearing later that year. Petition for Review, Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util.
Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n (No. 19-1147). The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s Order in 2020.
Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
The process of asserting jurisdiction over electric storage resources may have been faster than asserting
jurisdiction over demand response because it only contained one order and EPSA had set a relevant
precedent for it.
182. Compare EPSA, 577 U.S. 260, 272–76 (carefully taken but controversial agency rulemaking
that resulted in litigation lasting five years) with NARUC (carefully taken, less controversial agency
rulemaking that resulted in litigation lasting than two years).
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the state opt-out for demand response directly affects the market price.183 FERC can
assert jurisdiction over all wholesale rules related to demand response like in EPSA
or NARUC, defend against likely court challenges by the states and industry interests,
and delegate management and integration to wholesale market managers as much as
possible.184
Legally, to remove the state opt-out for demand response, FERC may have
to overcome both jurisdictional challenges under the EPSA test and procedural
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act.185 FERC can likely satisfy the
requirements of both EPSA and the Administrative Procedure Act, and the rest of
this section will evaluate each in turn.

1.

Surviving a Jurisdictional Challenge

EPSA lays out the relevant test for FERC’s jurisdiction to regulate rules or
practices affecting wholesale market rates.186 That is, FERC may change a rule or
practice if (1) the change directly affects wholesale rates; (2) the change does not
infringe upon areas traditionally regulated by the states, and (3) the first and second
elements are consistent with the Federal Power Act’s core purposes of increasing
reliability and decreasing wholesale prices.187
For the first element of the EPSA test, FERC must establish that the
current rule allowing states to opt out of demand response directly affects wholesale
rates.188 As the Supreme Court explained in its EPSA decision, demand response has
the natural effect of lowering wholesale rates.189 Because demand response pays
customers for commitments not to consume electricity—and only does so when those
commitments would actually cost less than the wholesale price—then removing the
state opt-out and bringing demand response to all states would also directly affect

183. See EPSA, 577 U.S. 260; NARUC, 964 F.3d 1177.
184. To integrate more wholesale demand response and the distributed energy resource aggregators
effectively, FERC should delegate management and integration to wholesale market managers as much as
possible. For example, in integrating demand response, FERC directed wholesale market managers to
determine cost-effective price points for integration of demand response in their markets; it may do the
same for the additional wholesale response. See FERC Order 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16658 (Mar. 24, 2011).
FERC has also directed the integration of distributed energy resource aggregators to the rulemaking of
wholesale market managers. FERC Order 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247, p. 4–5 (Sept. 17, 2020). This
delegation may both encourage more tailored regional approaches and prevent FERC from having
mandatory oversight over an overwhelming number of transactions. FERC may always restart this process
and mandate one national approach if one wholesale market manager’s approach proves to be the best at
curbing prices and increasing reliability and the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
185. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1185–86.
186. See id.
187. See id. (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 276-77).
188. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 276.
189. See id. at 278–79 (explaining that demand response bids are accepted “if and only if they bring
down the wholesale rate by displacing higher-priced generation”).
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wholesale rates and reduce them.190 Moreover, state action forbidding demand
response from participating in the wholesale market amounts to that state directly
regulating the wholesale market; as NARUC made clear, states may do no such
thing.191
For the second element of the EPSA test, FERC must establish that the
proposed rule eliminating state opt-outs for demand response does not regulate a
sphere left to the states by the Federal Power Act, including retail sales.192 There, the
Supreme Court noted that the state opt-out to demand response programs proved
the “finishing blow” to states’ arguments that FERC had regulated retail sales in
integrating retail customers’ commitments as wholesale demand response.193
However, both EPSA and NARUC offer support to the notion that a FERC order
removing the state opt-out to demand response would likely be upheld.
In EPSA, the Supreme Court also dismissed state arguments that FERC
regulated retail rates and therefore failed the second element of the EPSA
jurisdictional test.194 The Court instead held that where FERC regulations aim at the
wholesale market, their effect on state-jurisdictional facilities is legally irrelevant
because the question is what FERC regulations aim at, not what effect the regulations
may have.195 Thus, in integrating demand response into the wholesale market, FERC
regulated only wholesale market prices. Although the regulation may have had a
residual effect on retail market prices and brought commitments by some retail
customers into the wholesale market, that was “of no legal consequence” to the Court
because FERC’s regulation only aimed at and directly affected wholesale market
rates.196 Moreover, the Court noted that states may still insulate their retail market
from changes in wholesale prices as is their historical and jurisdictional prerogative.197
Therefore, according to the Court, if FERC focuses on regulating federal wholesale

190. See id. (explaining that, in a competitive wholesale market, more demand response decreases
wholesale rates). That is, wholesale demand response would only come into play in competitive markets
where demand response would actually lower wholesale costs by displacing higher-priced generation. Id.
Specifically, FERC developed a mechanism that required demand response bids not to be accepted if they
did not satisfy a “net benefits test” that compared the cost of the demand response bid with a calculation
that took into account the full effect of demand response on the marketplace. FERC Order 745, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16658 (Mar. 24, 2011). Each wholesale market manager is to determine on a monthly basis “a price
level at which the dispatch of demand response resources will be cost-effective” using historical data. Id.
191. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1187–88.
192. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279.
193. Id. at 287.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 279–85 (disregarding effect of FERC regulation on state-jurisdictional facility).
196. Id. at 281-82.
197. See id. at 286-87.
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markets in removing the state opt-out for demand response, its transgressions into
the states’ jurisdiction over retail transactions should be overlooked.198
In NARUC, the D.C. Circuit followed the EPSA test and rebuffed state
arguments that allowing electric storage resources to participate in wholesale markets
did not regulate facilities over which states have jurisdiction even though the electric
storage resources had to use state distribution networks to access the wholesale
market.199 FERC argued on the premise that it had not regulated state distribution
networks so as to stay clearly on its side of the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional
lines. The D.C. Circuit agreed. It held that, where FERC’s ability to make rules or
regulations affecting wholesale transactions clashed with state regulation of
distribution networks, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution ensured that
federal regulatory authority prevailed over state regulatory authority.200
For the third element of the EPSA test, FERC must establish that the first
and second determinations do not conflict with the Federal Power Act’s core
purposes to “curb prices and enhance reliability in the wholesale electricity
market.”201 Since the Supreme Court in EPSA opined that demand response with a
state opt-out did not conflict with these core purposes, a challenge to removal of the
state opt-out, which would further lead to lower prices and greater reliability in the
wholesale market, would be unlikely to succeed on this element.202 Beyond challenges
that an order to remove the state opt-out for demand response would exceed FERC’s
jurisdiction under the EPSA test, such an order would also likely be upheld against
Administrative Procedure Act challenges.203

2.

Surviving an Administrative Procedure Act Challenge

To survive an Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) challenge, FERC
must show its order “has examined the relevant considerations and articulated a
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the

198, Despite the benefits for retail consumers, as described in Section II.A, FERC’s focus should
remain on the benefits for the wholesale market lest states or retailers call foul.
199. Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 964 F.3d 1177, 1185–89 (D.C.
Cir. 2020).
200. Id.
201. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 277. Here, the Supreme Court opined that the position that FERC could
not regulate demand response would “subvert the [Federal Power Act]” by placing a practice that could
enhance reliability and curb prices outside the jurisdiction of any regulatory body. Id. at 288. That would
further mean that, under the Federal Power Act’s requirement that some entity have jurisdiction over
transactions for electricity, no transaction for demand response could proceed. Id. at 288-91.
202. See id. (explaining that the practice of demand response enhances the Federal Power Act’s core
purposes to lower prices and enhance reliability in wholesale markets).
203. Id. at 291–95; NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1189–90 (Both EPSA and NARUC withstood
Administrative Procedure Act arbitrary and capricious challenges).
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facts found and the choice made.”204 In doing so, the Court will examine the record
FERC has built regarding its findings and its consideration of opposing
viewpoints.205 Practically, to be upheld against such a challenge, FERC must follow
a certain procedure, and doing so also helps FERC establish jurisdiction under the
EPSA test.
First, FERC should investigate whether the current market rules or
practices—here, of removing the state opt-out for demand response—affect barriers
to entry for the newcomer.206 Second, if FERC finds that these market rules or
practices do affect barriers to entry, FERC should change those regulations via
informal rulemaking.207 For informal rulemaking, FERC has consistently used
notice-and-comment rulemaking followed by a final order that finds the market has
unduly discriminated and orders changes that will produce “just and reasonable”
wholesale prices.208
To remove the state opt-out, FERC should mirror procedures that it has
used successfully before. Specifically, previous sustained FERC actions have done
the following: investigation with a finding that the action will reduce prices and
increase grid reliability (which would also help satisfy the first and third elements of
the EPSA test),209 notice of proposed rulemaking (here, FERC can use the same net
benefit test as in FERC Order 745, which will ensure that the action actually lowers
wholesale prices and satisfies in part the third element of the EPSA test),210 and a
final order.211 Incorporating the above would aid FERC in two ways: FERC would
strengthen its defense against a claim that its action was arbitrary and capricious in
204. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 292 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1189.
205. See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 291-95; NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1189–90.
206. See, e.g., Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 75 Fed.
Reg. 15,362 (proposed Mar. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (addressing concerns that current
compensation schemes in markets impeded demand response participation).
207. See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2002); 16 U.S.C.
§824e(a).
208. See, e.g., Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (codifying changes made in response to
FERC’s investigation of the integration of demand response into markets).
209. This finding would satisfy the first element, which requires a finding that the rule or practice
would directly affect the wholesale price. This finding would also help satisfy the third element, which
requires the rule or practice to be in harmony with the Federal Power Act’s purposes of curbing prices and
enhancing grid reliability. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 277.
210. This assures partial satisfaction of the third step of the EPSA affecting jurisdiction test: that
FERC’s action does not conflict with the Federal Power Act’s core purposes of lowering wholesale prices
and enhancing wholesale reliability. Id.
211. See, e.g., id. at 292. Against an arbitrary and capricious challenge, “the court must uphold a
rule if the agency has ‘examine[d] the relevant [considerations] and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation
for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Id. (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 436 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)).
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violation of the APA and also establish a factual basis to support it against an EPSA
exceeding-jurisdiction challenge.212
An order removing the state opt-out would likely face a facial challenge but
may also face as-applied challenges, as NARUC pointedly noted.213 For example,
FERC could face an as-applied challenge by a state alleging that an Order removing
the state opt-out would conflict with its own regulations limiting how customers may
participate in the electricity retail market. In deciding to litigate or try to settle these
as-applied cases, FERC should consider the potential impact of demand response in
the market at issue, the extent of the as-applied challenge, whether FERC can extract
concessions in a settlement, the challenger’s resources, and its own resources, among
other things.
An order removing the state opt-out, if done carefully and to satisfy the
EPSA test and APA requirements, could succeed in promoting wholesale demand
response. The solution offered in this Note is preferable because FERC has sole
authority to remove the state opt-out and because full participation of demand
response in the wholesale market has extensive benefits for wholesale market prices
and reliability.

CONCLUSION
Since Congress enacted the Federal Power Act in 1935, the traditional
model of electricity generation and several of its accompanying assumptions have
been fundamentally undermined. The Act and subsequent precedent drew a brightline test between state and federal jurisdiction, but new technologies and
participation models presented challenging applications of that test because many
seem to fall on both sides of the line. These changes, and especially FERC’s action
to integrate wholesale demand response, have improved wholesale markets.
However, in giving states an opt-out to wholesale demand response, FERC limited
demand response’s potential. While removing the opt-out would likely be sustained
under the EPSA test, the recent NARUC case offers even stronger support for
removing the opt-out. Such an action could lower wholesale costs, increase reliability,
reduce reliance on dirty peak plants, cut greenhouse gas emissions, and help avert the
next blackout catastrophe.

212. Id. at 291–95; NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1189–90 (Both EPSA and NARUC withstood
Administrative Procedure Act arbitrary and capricious challenges).
213. NARUC, 964 F.3d at 1189–90.

